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1 Concepts of existence
In order to make the point of this paper, some preparations – explications and
distinctions – are necessary. The first concern is the concept of existence. In fact,
there is more than one such concept. There is a semantical concept of existence,
and several ontological ones. Themany concepts of existence are not always care-
fully distinguished.
According to the semantical concept of existence (which is precisely the con-
cept of existence employed in so-called “free logic”, but only in non-quantified
contexts), “N exists” means as much as “‘N’ refers to something” (for example,
“Pegasus exists” means as much as “‘Pegasus’ refers to something”). Given the
semantical concept of existence, true negative singular existence statements of-
fer no particular problem: “Pegasus does not exist” is true because “Pegasus”
does not refer to anything; “The present king of France does not exist” is true
because “the present king of France” does not refer to anything. However, the se-
mantical concept of existence cannot be the (only) concept of existence. This is
so because “exist” is, according to the semantical concept of existence, a pred-
icate of names (contrary appearances notwithstanding), not a predicate of non-
linguistic objects, and because we usually do intend “exist” to be a predicate of
non-linguistic objects (that is: we usually do intend it to be a predicate properly
speaking, a real predicate).
The ontological concepts of existence are characterizable without speaking
about –without referring in anyway to – singular terms. There are two ontological
concepts of existence: (1) The (real) predicate “x exists”maymeanasmuchas “x is
[identical to] something”; this interpretation of “exist” is used, for example, in the
following statement: “Some possible world exists which is not merely possible,
and some possible worlds exist which are merely possible.” (2) The (real) predi-
cate “x exists” may mean as much as “x is [identical to something which is] ac-
tual”; this other interpretation of “exist” is used in the following statement: “Some
possible world exists and, consequently, it is not merely possible, and some pos-
sible worlds do not exist and, consequently, they are merely possible.”
Of the two concepts of existence, the second one (described in (2)) is far more
interesting than the first (described in (1)); for according to the first concept, it is
a logically necessary truth that everything exists. If it is logically necessary that
everything exists, then true negative singular existence statements can only be
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had if (a) one allows that namesmaynamenothing–which is contrary to classical
logic – and if (b) one switches to the semantical concept of existence at least in
singular existence statements – which is an ad hoc measure in view of the fact
that singular existence statements, whether positive or negative, are, as a rule,
intended to have an ontological meaning.
Moreover, the intended ontological meaning of singular existence statements
is, usually, not the one which is in accordance with the first concept of existence;
rather, it is the one which is in accordance with the second. “I exist”, uttered by
me, has an ontological meaning; but does “I exist” mean that I am (identical to)
something (namely, myself)? It does not; for otherwise I, for one, would not be
ready to add “but I might not have existed” to “I exist”. It is logically impossible
that I – this person – am not (identical to) something; it is only possible that I am
not (identical to something which is) actual. I do not change the meaning of the
word “exist” from one sentence to the next, and I do not wish to assert falsehoods.
Thus, in saying “I exist, but I might not have existed” I am either saying that I am
actual and might not have been actual, or I am saying that I am something and
might not have been something. And the first has the considerable advantage of
being possibly true.
2 Actuality
Actuality is a close companion of possibility. Actuality logically includes possibil-
ity. In fact, actuality can be defined on the basis of possibility andmere possibility
as follows: x is actual if, and only if, x is possible, but not merely possible. If exis-
tence is identifiedwith actuality, thenmany true negative singular existence state-
ments offer, again, no particular problem: “Being a unicorn does not exist” is true
because the property of being a unicorn is not actual, in other words: because no
instance of it is actual; “The state of affairs that the sun revolves around the earth
does not exist” is true because that state of affairs is not actual, in other words:
it does not obtain, it is not a fact. “The assassination of Hitler does not exist” is
true because that event is not actual, in other words: because it did never happen.
What philosophers often balk at are nonactual individuals (in the narrow sense):
individuals (narrowly conceived, therefore non-events) which aremerely possible
or even impossible. Philosophers who reject nonactual individuals do not wish to
be “Meinongians”. The discussion of Meinongianism is not a concern of this pa-
per. Let me just say that I find nothing particularly objectionable in nonactual (or,
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for that matter, nonexistent)¹ individuals as long as one identifies them with the
merely possible individuals;² impossible individuals (individuals that cannot be
actual), which full Meinongians accept (thus moving beyond possibilism), I do
find ontologically problematic and somewhat hard to defend.
I move on to considerations regarding actuality which are more important
in the present context than Meinongianism. Actuality is one-sidedly entailed by
consciousness and by aliveness; aliveness, in turn, is one-sidedly entailed by con-
sciousness. In other words: Necessarily, nothing is alive or conscious which is not
actual, but not vice versa; necessarily, nothing is conscious which is not alive, but
not vice versa.³ Now, the basic assumption of this paper is that there is no such
thing as timeless consciousness, aliveness, and actuality; actuality, aliveness, and
consciousness are essentially time-related.
3 Three ways of time-relatedness
There are three ways of time-relatedness: (i) time-relatedness via individual refer-
ence, (ii) time-relatedness via quantificational reference, and (iii) indexical time-
relatedness. The essential time-relatedness of aliveness, for example (the same
point could also be mademutatis mutandis with respect to consciousness and ac-
tuality), consists in the following: In every interpretation of the predicate “x is
alive” which is consistent with its basic sense, the predicate “x is alive” must be
understood in one (and only one) of the following three ways:
(i) “x is alive at τ” (where “τ” stands for a non-indexical singular term that refers
to a particular time-point or to a particular set of time-points);
(ii) “For some τ: x is alive at τ” (where “τ” stands for a variable that runs over
time-points, or non-empty sets of time-points, or both over time-points and
non-empty sets of time-points);
1 I note inpassing thatMeinong identified existence andactuality; this is the identificationwhich
I, too, would recommend if one wished to have a predicate of existence at one’s disposal which
is not ambiguous.
2 See my defense of possibilism in Meixner (2006).
3 The following is also true: Necessarily, nothing is actual or possible which is not (identical to)
something, but not vice versa (the state of affairs that2+2 = 5 is something, but it is neither actual
nor possible); necessarily, nothing is actual which is not possible, but not vice versa (the state of
affairs that U.M. is never born is possible, but it is not actual). By putting two shorter chains of
one-sided entailment together,we obtain the following longer chain of one-sided entailment (one
with a central link): x is conscious→ x is alive→ x is actual→ x is possible→ x is something.
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(iii) “x is now (presently, currently) alive”.
The ways of the essential time-relatedness of aliveness will be of help in analyz-
ing more complex ways of essential time-relatedness which do not concern alive-
ness properly speaking but are still in the vicinity of it, for example, the time-
relatedness expressed by “x was alive”: “For some t: t was present before now
and x is alive at t”; or the time-relatedness expressed by “x is still alive”: “x is now
alive and for some t: t was present before now and x is alive at t and for every t′
which is such that t was present before t′ and t′, in turn, was present before now:
x is alive at t′”.
All these remarks can, of course, also be applied to consciousness and ac-
tuality.⁴ If the essential time-relatedness of actuality, consciousness, aliveness is
explicitly specified in one or the other of the three ways pointed out above, then
the entailment-chain “x is conscious→ x is alive→ x is actual” (established in the
previous section) needs to be adapted accordingly: (i) “x is conscious at τ → x is
alive at τ → x is actual at τ”; (ii) “For some τ: x is conscious → For some τ: x is
alive→ For some τ: x is actual”; (iii) x is now (presently, currently) conscious→ x
is now (presently, currently) alive→ x is now (presently, currently) actual”.
4 The living God
After the preparations in the preceding three sections, I now turn to themain con-
cern of this paper. It is a central teaching of Christianity – in all of its different ver-
sions – that God is a “living God”. What does that mean? Whatever it means, it is
certainly meant to entail the proposition that God is now alive (and therefore now
actual). This is, in fact, what every Christian believes; every single prayer attests to
4 However, here is a reason for doubting thatactuality is essentially time-related:What about the
actuality of abstract entities, the actuality of numbers, concepts, propositions? Is not at least their
actuality timeless? The objection is interesting if, and only if, some entities are abstract (which
is true if, and only if, necessarily some entities are abstract; the truth (if it is a truth) that some
entities are abstract is not contingent). Assuming that some entities are abstract, there are two
plausible ways to react to the objection: (A) One denies that any abstract entity is actual; one
asserts that, necessarily, every abstract entity is something (and therefore – qua something –
existent), but that, also necessarily, no abstract entity is actual. (B) One asserts that, for abstract
entities, the predicate “x is actual” – which still means the same as either “x is actual at τ”, or
“For some τ: x is actual at τ”, or “x is now (presently, currently) actual” – and the predicate “x is
(identical to) something” are logically equivalent; in this way, actuality is still essentially time-
related, but its time-relatedness has become trivial.
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this belief – as well as to the belief that God is now conscious and now actual (and
is not amere possibility). Now, if therewere noTime,⁵ it wouldnot be true that God
is now actual, and not true that God is actual at some time, and not true that God
is actual at time τ; and it would not be true that God is now alive, or at some time
alive, or alive at time τ; and it would not be true that God is now, or at some time,
or at time τ conscious. The actuality, aliveness, consciousness of God depends
on the existence of Time. This dependence is a sine-qua-non (or negative) depen-
dence; it is also – in view of the essential time-relatedness of actuality, aliveness,
and consciousness – an essential (or necessary) dependence: God cannot – abso-
lutely cannot – be actual, alive, or conscious without the existence of Time. Thus,
if Time did not exist, then, as a necessary – absolutely necessary – consequence,
God would neither be conscious, nor alive, nor actual, and one might as well say:
he would not exist. If, however, actuality, aliveness, and consciousness are prop-
erties which God necessarily has (believers usually take actuality, aliveness, and
consciousness to be such properties), then, as a necessary consequence, Time ex-
ists just as necessarily as God himself exists necessarily in virtue of his necessarily
having those properties.
Obviously, an important question must be answered in order to make the as-
sertions in the previous paragraph fully intelligible: What does it mean that Time
exists? (If we come to know this, we will, of course, also know what it means that
Time does not exist.) Minimally, that Time exists means that Time is something –
where, necessarily, Time is (identical to) something if and only if Time is the set of
(all) time-points. This necessary bi-conditional is no great surprise, because Time
just necessarily is the set of time-points.⁶ Alternatively, and rather less minimally,
that Time exists means that Time is actual – where, necessarily, Time is actual if
and only if (a) Time (the set of time-points) is non-empty and (b) every time-point
was, is (now), or will be present.
There can be no doubt that Time exists in the sense of Time being actual, and,
at the same time, there can be no doubt that the mere assertion “Time is actual”
is still far from providing a full ontological description of Time – the above anal-
ysis of its actuality notwithstanding. Such a full description will not be provided
in this paper.⁷ However, here are two additional details about Time which are of
5 I write the word “time” with a capital “T” wherever it serves as a proper name with honorific
character.
6 N(a = b ⊃ ∃x(a = x)) is a logical truth, and if N(a = b) is true, then N(∃x(a = x) ⊃ a = b)
is also true (as a trivial modal-logical consequence). It follows (by elementary modal logic): if
N(a = b) is true, then N(∃x(a = x) ≡ a = b) is true.
7 More can be found in Meixner (1997) and Meixner (2010).
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particular importance for the purposes of this paper: (A) The time-points in Time
constitute a strict linear order (an order which is structurally just like the order
constituted by the elements in any set of real numbers). (B) Each time-point in
Time becomes present – singly – and ceases to be present in a succession inex-
orably proceeding in one single direction along the linear order of Time. Thus,
Time is not only actual in the above-defined sense; it is, moreover, (i) always true
for all time-points t and t′ in Time that t′ was, is or will be present before t if and
only if t′ is before t (that is, timelessly before t in the linear order of Time), and (ii)
always true that every time-point in Time is present only once,⁸ and (iii) always
true that exactly one time-point in Time is present.
5 The main worry, and why one need not worry
The main worry is a theological worry. If God depended on Time (in the above-
described way), would this not make God ontologically dependent on Creation?
The ontological dependence of God on Creation would be a highly heterodox con-
sequence, a consequence which should not be accepted, I believe. But how can
this consequence be avoided without denying that God depends on Time?
There are, basically, two ways of avoiding God’s dependence on Creation
while accepting his dependence on Time:
(I) Time itself is not created; it is an uncreated part of Creation.
(II) There is uncreated Time and created time; the latter is a part of Creation, the
former is not.
Consider solution (I) to the difficulty: According to it, there is just one time. The
time on which God is dependent is an uncreated part of his essence and at the
same time an uncreated part of Creation. Since Time is uncreated, God does not
depend on Creation by depending on Time (although Time is indeed a part of Cre-
ation – but not a created one). Consider solution (II) to the difficulty: According to
it, there are two times. The time on which God is dependent is an uncreated part
of his essence; the other time is created time, a created part of Creation. God does
not depend on created time, he only depends on uncreated Time – which, how-
ever, is not a part of Creation; therefore, again, God does not depend on Creation
by depending on Time.
8 In other words, it is always (that is: was always, is now, and will always be) the case that any
time-point t in Time which is present was never present already and will never be present again.
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Prima facie it might be thought that both solutions contradict divine simplic-
ity because they both take Time to be a part of God’s essence. For rebutting this
objection, it is necessary to introduce a further distinction. The essence of God in
the narrow sense is simple. It is the essence God is identical to, as (for example)
Thomas Aquinas taught. The essence of God in the wide sense is the essence of
God in the narrow sense pluswhatever proceeds (“flows”) per se (or eo ipso) from
God’s essence in the narrow sense. The essence of God in the wide sense is not
identical to God; rather, it is identical to God and his divine life. If Time is asserted
to be “a part of God’s essence”, then it is, within theological reason, merely as-
serted to be a part of God’s essence in the wide sense (namely, in virtue of being
a part of what proceeds per se from God’s essence in the narrow sense); it is not
asserted to be a part of God’s essence in the narrow sense. For it could not be a
part of God’s essence in the narrow sense: the essence of God in the narrow sense
– being God himself – has no (proper) parts.
The problem with solution (I) is that many theologically interested philoso-
phers, or philosophically interested theologians, are uncomfortable with uncre-
ated parts of Creation.⁹However, are not numbers and universals uncreated parts
of Creation? Was not Christ in his divine nature an uncreated part of Creation? If
there are no uncreated parts of Creation, then what good reasons are there for us
to assume that there is anything uncreated beyond so-called Creation? And what
good reasons, then, are there for us to assume anything about the nature of the un-
created allegedly beyond so-called Creation? A perfectly analogical situation in a
quite different area of philosophymay serve to highlight the force of the latter two
questions: Epistemologists assumed in the past – andmany of them still assume–
that in cognition we only deal with representations. However, if we only deal with
representations, then what good reasons are there for us to assume that there is
anything beyond the so-called representations: something which they represent?
Andwhat good reasons, then, are there for us to assumeanything about the nature
of the something allegedly beyond the so-called representations?
The problem with solution (II) is that we certainly seem to be talking only
about one time, not about two times, even when speaking about God. And if there
were two times after all, one for God and another for us (at least in this world),
what would be the relation between the two times? This seems to be a question
which is not worth the effort of trying to find a plausible answer to it – because
it seems unavoidable that the effort is spent in vain. This, if true, would reflect
rather negatively on solution (II); it would be a serious drawback to it. However,
9 In Christianity, this is mainly true of the western tradition. The eastern tradition is rather more
accepting of uncreated parts of Creation: see Bradshaw (2004), 207–220, 232–238.
112 | Uwe Meixner
since there is a causal relation between God and Creation, one possible answer to
the posed, supposedly “embarrassing” question is the following: The two times
are related like game-time and player-time. The state S′ of a game (for example, of
a chess-game) follows in game-time the state S of the game if and only if the ac-
tion that produces S′ follows in player-time the action that produces S. Let this
bi-conditional define the relationship between game-time and player-time; for
the purposes of this paper, no further assumptions are necessary. Note that a
large amount of player-time may pass between the two actions which produce
two states of the game that are immediately consecutive to each other in game-
time (every chess-player knows this). It is also conceivable that a lot of game-time
passes between two game-states, with many and various purely rule-determined
(in other words, purely law-determined) game-states in between the two, while
the two actions which produce “truly significant change” at the beginning and at
the end of the process – because they produce the two game-states in question –
are immediately consecutive to each other in player-time.
Obviously, created time corresponds to game-time, uncreated Time to player-
time. The idea is certainly not implausible and notwithoutmerits.¹⁰What inclines
me nevertheless to reject solution (II) and to accept solution (I) –which, to repeat,
is based on the assumption, on the idea that there is only one time, at once an
uncreated part of God’s essence and an uncreated part of Creation – is a fact of
lived religion, a fact which neither philosophy nor theology can sidestep: When
believers speak of the livingGod, they certainlymean that God is now living in their
time. In fact, that God is now living in our time appears to be one of the messages
of God’s self-definition in Exodus 3, 14: God tells Moses that he, God, is “the I-am”.
By this, he did not mean to say “I am the I-am-like-the-natural-numbers-are”. And
he did not mean to say “I am the I-am-in-my-own-sweet-time”. He meant to say “I
am the-I-am-now-in-your-time-and-in-mine”.
If Time is at once an uncreated part of God’s essence and an uncreated part
of Creation, then we – created beings – partake in every moment of our conscious
existence ontologically and cognitively of God’s uncreated essence.We should not
forget this.
10 It is treated in detail in Meixner (2010).
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